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A Case of Contlnuity: The Cartel izati~n
of the Western European
Montanindustriej

1933-1945, and the

European Coal and Steel Community.
by
John.Gillingham

. A C~se of Continuiti: · The Cartelization
of the Western European Montanindustrie, _
-1933-1945,·and the.European Coal and
Steel Community.

John Gillingham, Ph.D. Assistant Professor- of History and
Research Fellow, Center for
International Studies
15 September 1979 . ·

The formation of the Europ~an .Coal and Steel Community
culminated a quarter-century of effort.by the heavy industry
of the Ruhr•to-enlist its·western European counterparts in·
· ·cooperative schemes to coordinate. production, share marke-ts,
.·maintai:q. prices, develop reciprocal. supply andcommon sel_ling
arrangeme~ts, plan investments,. ari'a ·facilitate· operatior; c;~ ·
a pressure· group both within industry. and in politics. generally.
Ultimate success was .due only in part to the existence of

a

common threat to theContinent from US producers. and cannot·
be explained. merely as the result of Ruh:r P.reponderance wi thi-n
it.

It required the conversion of the leaders of. heavy in·-.

dustry in.France. and the Benelux nations to a faith in pro.saucer regulation of markets and "rationalization," a· Continen'

.

,

.

.

,

..

, tal. trading bloc, and, of co.urse, German .lea~ership.

.The ·

process, begun.with the establishment in 1926 of the first
International Steel Cartel~ was largely accomplished in the
years from 1933 to .1945 •. • In the 19.30s the Ruhr succeeded in
cartelizing· European exports of coke and coal· as we.11 as·
steel, and promoting the organization·of·its counterparts
along .familiar German lines. -· Indeed it .created an· ,?-/,

. .

-

-

.

Interssengemeinschaft of West European.and British heavy industry which worked to the-satisfactio'n of all its members .
. _The German occupation of Western Europe subjected -these accom- .plishments to terriblestrainsbut; the case of. Britain·
except:ed, did not undo them.· The Ruhr, albeit with some
hesitation~, acted•within theframework-of·pre-war policies,

-------

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~

2.

-I

and "c.ollaboration". represented an attempt on the part of theconquered to do likewise.

In some cases, pre-war traditions

were even built· on:_. there was in -Western Europe a further
assimilation.of German organizational methods, the development
-of new;,Reich-patterned relationships-between private power
- · and -public _authority, and· an opportunity to become --familiar
with t_he pr6blems of, administering -coal and ste:et · on a" r-egional
· basis.'

The events, of -the occupation also joined producers in ·

a'kind of.mutual defense pact against the vicissitudes of
,politics.

So it was that;cooperation between them survived

· - even the collapse and partition of Germany in 1945 .The International -Steer Cartel of 1926 (ISC)· was first
.

~

an_d foremost· ein Kind der Not,· one born of the excess· raw
'

.

'

steel ca:paci ty irr Europe after. ·world wa:r · r.

_

-

It owes ,its

origins to_ a: bargain· struck be.tween -the - steel producers ;of
.

France.and ~he Ruhr.

-

By an agreement of 4 November 1926,

Germany ceded a portion o-f her steel market, heretofore duty
free, to. French and Luxemburgish exporters. ·This was .the,
·_· famous t'Contingent Lorrain-luxembourgeois."

Thereafter; Franco-

German political disagreement ·ceased to present.a major difficulty to the cartelization -of European steel export markets.
Success depended rather on overcoming the differenqes,in the
.business traditions of the countries invol ve_d. · The crux· of
the matter,was that effective regulation-of export markets
'

.

-al~o required producer ·control· of· domestic sales.

_The sig-

- natorie~ of the 1926 agreement, while ·recogni.zing this fact,
could.not all.act upon it with equal facility. - Strong; producer.

,

i

I

i

3

organizations existed only in Germany. ·Elsewhere, important.
b~ginnings were nonethe.less made. - In 1926 the French revived
the Comptoir Siderurgigue.

In Belgium, the .S,ociete Generale
'

.

.

de Belgique, a holding.,coi:npany which controlled most of that
nation's steel industry, committed its elf to_: promoting industrial organization on the German. model;

(Luxemburg, .a· major

exporter of steel products, lacked a sufficiently large'ddmes. tic market to be. of- concern in thi.s respect. )

The . final main

European steei-prodhcer~ ~reat Britain, was too disorganized
···to .be considered. kartellfahig by ,the others. and therefore
ineligible for membership·. in the ISC.
The structure of the ISC was ,the outcome of a hedged bet
on the part of its_founder~members that control of-export
•·
A

l

·•markets 'could be effective even in.,lieu of strong dome·stic
producer organ'izations .• ' . It was . set- up so as- to foster car:...
telization of domestic markets through successes ·on foreign,,.
_ones, and with the hope that .the. one would eventually reinforce ·
the other.

The founder.:.mernbers (Germany; France, Belgium, and

Luxemburg) would thus meet quarterly to set global production
quotas, covering both-markets, which.were then subdivided by
subsidiary export_ cartels. for specific· commodities. •. The
remainder of the-authorized production was left to be marketed
· domestica.lly.

The. "tail" refused,.· however, to wag the "dog";

arrangements brokedowri. at several points, notably from 1926
to 1929, as-a result of German overproduction to meet accelerating dorne.stic :demand~ and, definitively,. in.1931-as a result
-of Belgian dumping. 1

Collapse should not, however,.be equated with failure~
By 1933 each founder-member had acquired a huge stake in continuing to·do business on the basis.of Ruhr leadership and
methods.
ment.

In February.they entered a more far-reaching agree-

Its most.important new.features were to make a clear

theoretical•· distinction. between domestic. and foreign. sales
and t9 create stronger.machinery to govern ~ach . . Joint;s~~ling
agencies. (comptoirs) were.set up to market.the sale of the
main rolled-· export cormnodi ties ·---semis -

~

merchant bars,

joints and channels, heavy·and medium plates,·and universals~They coordinated sales policies, fixed·prices_and terms of
.

.

.

sale, set product standards, and.regulated the activities of
sales agents .in several categories.

Export quotas were based

on a sliding. scale of total tonnage from 6·. 8 million to 11. 5
. m.illion tons.

Germany• s. ranged· from 29:. 2% · to 33. 7%; Belgium •s,. •

from -29.0% to 26%; France•s, from 20.6%.to 23·.5%; Luxemburg•s,
from 21.2% to 16.8%.

Each national group, moreover, pledged·

itself to strengthen domestic producer organizations, in
effect to create parallel versfons of the.Stahlwerksverband.
·.The. stake. of .each. founder-member naturally, varied, but
· · .··that of Luxemburg was the greatest and. most obvious:
.

her· sur-

.

. vi val wa,s· at the mercy of the Ruhr.

'Steel was. _.the only. signi-

ficant _industry. of the Grand Duchy.

90% of her average annual

·output was normally exported.

Of her steel producers'"'.-Rodange,
.

I

HADIR, and.ARBED---the latter was by far the most significant,
', ·i·

and in Europe ·sec.end· in ra.w steel c~paci ty only to Vez:\einigte

·.

.i

.

~tahlwerke,· ARBED also had substantial holdings in G~rmany

I.
!

..

5
,,....

which.she.had·acquired prior to 1918, when Luxemburg was
~,

·within the Reich customs area.

It owned outright Eschweiler

Bergwerke, which produced.nine".""tenths of the coal from.the
_Aachen district, some 7-7. 8 million .•tons ·per year..

It also .

.controlled Felten Guilleaume of Koln, one of the largest
electrical· manufacturing companies in Germany.·.. On 1 January
1925 the Ruhr agreed to allow ARBED to continue.supplyiIJ,g_j.ts
··. two ··Rhenish subsidiaries with semi,;..f inished steel and thus to
'

..

,'

.

'

retain its character as an integrated Konzern administered
from Luxemburg. 2

This issue having been settled, Luxemburg·

became.the Ruhr's closest foreign ally.

The proposal for the

first.International Steel Cartel.was·voiced by Dr. Emil
Mayrisch, chief executive officer of ARBED.
its. first chairman.

He also became

Here a precedent was set:

his successor .

as· botI. ARBED and International Steel Cartel Chairman, .or·.
Aloys · Meyer, would . also serve as mouthpiece for Ruhr· policy.
'

'

'

'Luxemb rg, for its part, would remain the favorite.of the
Ruhr-u til 1939.

At virtually no point in the history of

either cartel did significant disagreement.arise between the
two pa ties~ .
Te stake.of the "Belgian group"·requires more lengthy
descri tion.

One must begin by mentioning. that the industry

of. the·country was.not represented as such in the international
steel cartel.

This responsibility was rather assumed by

Societe.G~nerale·de Belgique, which had'steel interests within
as well as outside of Belgium . . It. headed the Belgian censor"".'
.. tium that held majority control· of ARBED · and another in w_hich
it shared control of HADIR with the French Laurent group.

i

i

6

One of the partners in .both consortia, ·the Banque de Bruxelles/
Brufina/Cofinindus/Qugree--Marihaye complex, owned outright the
.third of Luxemburg's producers, Rodange.

"La Generale~" and

the Banque .de Bruxelles .as well, had steel'properties of equal
value. in Belgium· itself.·.. The former controlled Cockerill, La
Providence, Sambre-et-Moselle ~ :Angleur-Athus, •and ··Thy-Ie'Ch§.teau; the latter, Ougree-Marihaye and· ,Acieries Minie~e~_ de
· la Sambre; the two owned Esperence-L·angdoz jointly..

A number

of feisty independents produced the remainingBelgianoutput.
Belgium normally exported 40-50% of her annual steel produc"."'
tion of three million tons per year.

The industry enjoyed a

• domestic.· coal base, rather two of· them.

The southern basin

had traditfonally supplied three-quarters of domestic.coke
requirements but was : the longest-worked, most high-cost dis- ·
.

trict in· Europe.

-

;

The mines of the Campin~/Kempen, first· ,put .·

into operation' afte'r Wor~d War I, produced a steadily incr~asing portion of overall- output.

As w:ith steel, some coal output,

normally 20%, was sold by independent Operators.

.J

Belgium had

_·a net coal balance by weight but a .coke deficit of_ 2 to 3
million tons·per year, which the Ruhr·normally supplied.

The

Societe Generale,- then,· looked to the Ruhr ·to protect its·

I ..

-

. -.

intererts in Luxemburg, provide· a reliable s-ource of coking
I,

coal, and, abo_ve·' all, discipline Belgian "recalcitrants."'

I

.

.

.

T~e disorder on Belgian markets alsoprovided."la

I

Generaie" a pretext ~ith which to- pry concessions . f rem her
partneks. in the ISC--to their mind,. something· that occurred

. I

..

too. oft~n and_. succe~sfully.

.

.

They therefore conditioned

I

I

- I

!

I

I

I

7

Belgian. admission into the new. _cartel on the set up· of
stronger machinery to.regulate-domestic sales.

The Depres~

sion helped ~he Soci~ti G~nirale and th~Banque Bruxelles
in this respect; they acquired several bankrupt foundries
b.etween 1929 and 1933.

On 31 May 1933 a cooperative commer-

--cial company, IICosibel 11 (Comptoir de Vente de la Siderurgie
· Belge) , was founded to Operate as a- selling agent ,on bo"t:h -~
.

.

· domestic arid foreign markets. _- Its authority ·extended to· most
but not all steel products an<;i did not include the large group
pf independent - "re-rollers/" which later gave ri·se to problems.
thus continued .to need out.sid~ support and -

_IILa Generale 11

Belgium remained the most troub_lesome of -the
.

·rsc

founder- -

. ·3

m.ernbers.

The incorporation of the."Contirigent·Lorrain-Luxernbourgeois"
into'. the 1926 ISC agreement; not only eliminated.the -major point
·- . of disagreement- bet.we,en· the; steel industries of the Reich and
France ·but,gave the latter<a special stake in·its survival •.
.

.

.

·_ The French· national group was dominated by the big .family in-- terests of Lorraine-,. de Wendel and Laurent, whose district
·~ormally accounted for over 90% of France's-steel exports.

The

other .main· French steel producing area,-· Nord-Pas,.;..de-Calais,
-normally supplied manufacturers locat_ed riearby and iri the
.

Paris basin.

.

'

"

Producer regulation had 1ongbeen the rule on

French domestic steel. markets~

Th_e· Comptoir Siderurgique

_acted as a ··domestic cartel· and was :also the French representative to the ISC.

It con'tained subsidiaries for the major

· --. commodities -.(rails, tubes, wire rods; structural_ shapes,

8

semis-, etc.), which, in.turn,.were'subdivided-into foreign
and. domestic ·sections. · · Problems similar to · those involving
Belgian participation simply did not arise,. and Franco.-German
· harmony .was the rule.
Coal was the main concern of French foundrymeri._ France
.was the world's. largest importer of the·commodity, some 17 to.
25 million tons per'year, including.2.7 to 4.3milliontons
·. -of coking coal, or over 30% of -aririual requirements.

Although

Britain was a large exporter to France, shecould'not compete
with the:Ruhr-in the s:upp'iy of coking coal to the Lorraine
'

foundries,
-

-

Its mines normally-provided four-fifths-of their
'

requirements.

The terms of the coal-iron ore exchange caused

additional -French concern.·

They worked' increasingly to her

·· disadva:ntage as i t became cheaper for- the Ruhr to -consume :the ·
higher grade Swedi~hproduct.

By 1938,Germany wasimporting

nearly 9 million tons of :Swedish ore•as compared to only 5
million tons from-· France.

The efforts of the Lorraine producers

to develop alternative sources of supply from the Netherlands,
-

'

'

·.· Belgium, and locally with the help of massive governmental
subsidies did not significantly decrease their dependence on
Ruhr coal.

In fact, their only significant bargaining-counter
was thepolitical and military power of France itself. 4 .
Th-e Dutch. stake in cooperation with: the Ruhr also .increased :
·. iri the late 1920s even<thoughc she wasC not formally a. member
of the ·International- _Steel Cartel. · The single steel foundry
in the Netherlands, Koninklijke Hoogovens, built in 1920 at ·
. Ijmuiden· north of Amsterdafu, was oriented to ;maritime sources·

9

· of supply and markets~•
shareholder~

The City. of ·Amsterdam was its largest·

The two maihDutch "re-rollers," van Lier and

"Demka,", were,·tenacious independents •. Dutch' coal and steel
were·not ·integrated •. The Limburg mines-""."the most modern.and
efficient in Europe--were first put into operation after
.,

World War I.

Ownership of- them was•divided between the Dutch

state (Staatsmijne:n), with 60% of total production, (19,3~ 14;321,269t)-, ·and foreign capital.

The Societe Generale owned

Laura· en Vereiniging (with an 1·1% share in· production) , de
Wendel, Oranje--Na~sau (with a .19% share), and the rest was_
controlled;by other Belgian.groups.-_ Th,e state mines were
fierce competitors. on coke markets during _the: early l:920s.
The Dutch._ stake in the Ruhr ·.grew by way of_ the -coal
-- trade and can be traced through: a single personal :connection,
. Frederik :_.ff. Fentener van Vlissingen. - His family. and the
Rheinisches-Westfalisches K.ohlensyndikat joi~tlY owned the
main. Dutch coal wholesaler, .. Steenkolen Handelsvereeniging.
He was also one.of the founders of, and major shareholders 'in,
the Ijmuiden works ■-

In1922 he arranged as condition of a

loan .an exchange of.shares between_Hoogovens•and theRuhr.
steel firm, .Phoenix AG.· He then became the custodian of· the
Dutch interests in Phoenix, some -30%:ofshare_capital. ·In
_· 1926 Phoenix· became p?J.rt qf Vereinigte Stahlwerke_, thus giving. ·
him .control of an estimated 10-12%. of its ·shares.

-This inter-

p~net~ation of interests did not in fact remove .all sources·

·. ot
.

conflict between Ijmuiden and· the DU:tcli ''re-rollers". on ·the
.

one h~nd .and the .cartel oh the other.

It. did,· however, contri-

bute -to the conclusion of an·. agreement with re·gard to coal~ ·

10
Inl929 theStaatsmijnen, along with·the private Limburg
.mines, agreed with Steenkolen Handelsvereenigirig to end price
.underbidding and c~mpeti tion for customers: S
Two, conditions were propituous to the advancement of
'

"

.

.

the international cartelization movement in heavy industry
. during the 1930s.

The first was the persistence of world

depression combined.with the political failures of the demo-~-

.cracies; the second, the rise of German business power.

The

latter resulted ·not only·• from Germany's extraordinary recovery
from the depression and political expansion. but from the pri'

'

.· vileged position of business under national socialism.. Under.
Hitler. if had the opportunity to· put into practice its·• tradi. tional philosophy of· indus.trial organization •... A tacit understanding. governed the.relations between the two of them:
ness would supp.art the regime an·d
the economy.

in. turn

busi-

be allowed to run .

"Industrial s~lf-regulat:i.on" (industrielle ·

Selbstverwal tung). in fact became official nazi economic policy.
-

.

-

.

•All .producers were required to join the appropriate subsidiaries,
organized by branch. and locale, of a huge public· corporation,.·
Reichsgruppe Industrie.

It acted as the official policy agent

for business and the government.

Both.it and.its subsidiaries,

I

I
I

theWirtschaftsgruppen, served as clearing houses for govern. ,ment. contracts, administrators of rationing procedures,

.I

j

I

mobilization.agencies, and agents of Reich economic policy
abroad. ·The regime also encouraged cartel formation, .and
industry in fact became. more thoroughly cartelized after ,193'3 ·
·than ever before or since·. · Cartels, not the Wirtschaftsgruppen, ·

;;:,

i

!

I

11

regulated.production •.

This fact resulted in a wary suspicion

between business and the regime and, at times, confrontatio~. 6
. ·The most important such incident concerned the steel industry.
In· 1936, . the Ruhr refused 'the demand of Reichsmarschall Hermann
Goring to invest ·massively in a huge new foundry operation ·.
based on the consumption of the low-grade ores of Salzgitter.
'It feared excess capacity and preferred to.do business along.
well-established lines.

Goring thereupon created a new cor-.

poration, the Reichswerke, to' ·develop the new low-grade ore
. operation.

It would develop·by·l939 into the world's. largest

conglomerate. · The influence of the Reichswerke in. the politi•cs
of international steel would.not, however, be felt until the
war years. 7 In the years. 1933-1939 the power of the Ruhr
.vis

a

vis her: Western European counterparts increased steadily.

The bouyancy of.the German economy put her in the enviable
position.of.having unfillablemarketquotas; both domestic and·
. foreign, to allocate among eager claimants. · In addition,

~I

th~ Anschluss, occupation of the Sudetenland and.March

I

I

on Prague put at her disposal those of former cartel affiliates.
More significantly,.cumulative .successes of the Third Reich
in. the economic field,generated the broad movement termed
. "industrial- appeasement'.' in the case· of Great Britain• and
II industrial collaborath:in l~ in the case o'f France and the Low
.Countries.
Agreement with Britain opeJ?.ed the door to the·success
o.f Ruhr policy in the 1930s. · ·. Sh'e was. traditionally the Ruhr's
strongest competitor on European coal -and coke· markets.

Her . ·

I

\

12
coal reserves were by.far the largest.in ·Europe.
.

.

Several.

.

districts . (Scotland, Northumberland, Durham, S. Wales) were
located in c~ose proximity to the coast and therefore favorably positioned for the export trade.

She had traditionally

dominated sales. to Scandinavia, along the North Sea coast,
and in the Mediterranean basin.

As a steel exporter, she was

less formidable, at . least outside of the Commonwealth.
was.the destination of 80% of her total exports.

}t;_

Britain,

which·until 1 March 1932 levied no.tariff on iron and steel
products, was also:a major importer of them.

British exports

-of both coal and steel products declined considerably in
the interwar perio_d, the: former from 74,578,000 long tons
in 1913 to A0,985,000 long tons in 1938, the latter ftom ·
4,969,225 long tons to 1,961,951 long tons between the same
years.
Successive heads of both.the Bank of England .and·the.
Board of Trade attributed these declines above all.to disorganization, which was indeed considerable.

In 1930, 2328

mine-shafts were in operation in Great Britain, .employing
I
an .average of 405 persons with average production of 104,760
I

long tons.

i

.

The comparable ~igures for the Ruhr. were 180,

1993,
. and 595, 4.83 long:
. . . tons JI The sltuation in British steel
was only somewhat bett.er~ · The 1930s brought '.a spate of legislative enactments intended ~:o remedy. this •situatio~.- .· The
Mining Law of l August 1930 required the formation of quota
cartels in each district and empowered new Executive Boards
to levy penalties .for sales lbelow established price.minima.

··

13
A 1934,· modification set price. ranges for _both domestic ·and·
foreign markets.

A subsequent act o·f Parliament created

-so~called Central Selling .Schemes for each district.:. Change
.in the organization of the steel industry came in more dramatic fashion.-

Th.e· British Iron and Steel Federation, founded

19 April 1934, was a ,."double cartel" built on the German model
which, in addition to acting as a trade association, to~k
over such governmental responsibilities as issuing steel import licenses.

In 1932 the Government---in,an effor't.to

•. breathe life into the new_ industrial. organizations-•-ordered
-

.

'

-

representatives of the.coal and steel industries to begin
•. negotiations for expoz-t settlements with the . Ruhr.

They

.began :in 1932, -brought an Anglo-German coke ''understanding"
0

in 1934, British - a ffiliation w:ith the ISC .·in 1935. followed
by. an international coke cartel, arid an 1'und1:rstanding 11 . in
·.· '

1936;with·regard to coal.

8

·Through.these arrangements the .Ruhr succ.eeded in fitting
Great Britain to her, grand design..

_First of all, i t won

British assent to· its domination o·f Western Europe's coal
and coke markets, the lure in this case being the offer of a
generous overall. sales quota.· - Britain not only accepted the
prin9iple of Gruppenschutz--~non-c_ompeti tion in .established
markets--..;but agreed ·to impose it .. on. o.ther European coking
coal exporters (notably Poland) and on <lomestic producers,
,. as well.

The : arrangements, in 0th.er words, protected export

prices while increa·sing the dependence of Western· Eu1:ope on
Ruhr sUpp•lies of coking coal. · From· the standpoint of the
. Ruhr, Britain's -affiliation with the ISC .· served quite a different·

14

.purpose, namely to buffer the Continent from US·competition.
The Ruhr once agafn ceded :Britain a generous quota which
could only be .used in overseas markets,.thus eliminating the
threat of·competition on the:Continent,and, at·the same time,
giiing Britain the largest stake in protecting-remaining
international markets.

As if·to emphasize the distinction

between the two, Great Britain did not ·actually become
.

c3;.

:_ .

.

.

member of-the International Steel·Cartel. ·Instead, a new
organization, awkwardly named the "Joint Coordinating Board,"
.

-

was set up to represent the. interests of the .Briti-sh when they
touched on those of. the·"continental group."' 9 ·· The British
were responsible·for the conduct of the negotiations which,
in 1938, l_ed ·- to US affili•ation with· the. ISC. -It was based
,on an ''understanding11·.thatUS producers would refrain from
.

.

.

selli•ng in European marke:ts but. enjoy "spheres of-influence"
in others .for a-.list of specified'products.

Because of anti-

trust legislation, US enforcement of it depended on.the
.agreement·of'the Big Three steel companies,·us•Steel, Bethlehem,
and Republic,·. to .force compliance . on the._ remairtder of the
industry.

The. "understanding" was regarded by all parties

as a substantial·narrowingof'the divide between

us

and

~uropean busin~ss p;actices.10
How, :then, did the Ruhr build the Interessengemeinschaft
in ·Western Europe in the 1930s?.

First, by /"loyal" behavior

· ·. towards its· partners, sometimes at risk of conflict with ·the
regime.

It strengthened the alliance with the .Societe

Generale .in the face of heated protests from the RWM. by

I

I

-I

I

I

i

j

15

.

· ··.ceding Belgium a ''Lorraine ... type'' quota on the German market

~

in 1934~ and a similar one for coal at a later date.· With
regard to France,· it delayed conclusion of the ISC agreement
with·Britain until the. latteragreed to compensate Lorraine
for the imposition. of a. new ad .valorem t_ariff -on semi-:-finished.
steel products, -took over the French Saar-· raw steel ·export
quota when it joined the Reich, and punctiliously deliv~re~ .
. coal after 1936 in spite of an increasing·deficit in ieciprocal
.

.ore .shipments~
~'

.

As for Luxemburg, thiaRuh~ delivered it coking

coal slated by _trade treaty,for shipment to Italy and gave it _
substantially
,

-

'

~

larger shares oh the German market as well as ·
•

>

'

. the ·right ·to a~ unpenalized share of: its export· quota iri the
'.years between 1937 and 1939.ll ·common.external threats also
bound the ISC founder-members together •. _-_ They of· course .
-negotiated as.

a bloc

the terms of British. and us affiliation

and.dfdlikewise,with the-threat of-new competition.-

They

agreed unanimously· on .1.8 April .19 39, for example, to take
every measure necess~ry to force the Dutch "re-rollers" Demka
and Van Lier---each then· in ·.the midst of· an ambitious expansion.
program---out · of business., ·d 'Heur, of Belgium, noting that
•J

~,·.such industrialization• must be brought· to a halt."

·theme would sound. time and again af ISC meetings.

This

ISC objec-

. tions terminat~d the·-plans in 1938 of an English· consortium
-_led by.HermanBrassert·to construct a· steel complex in Bulgaria.
Refusal to-deliver construction steel delayed completion cf
the.mill under construction. inKarakilk, Turkey.

Considerable

-effort was.made·in-1937 and 1938 to frustrate .the erection

16
of.· a rolling >mill at Bergen, Norway .12
sentative stated in this connection:

·The British. repre"It appears from infer~

mation •• ·.·we were able to gather that A/S Bergens Bliktrykkeri
intends to erect a new hbop· mill.· . As the· ISC have every reason
to prevent the realization of such.a design, we have conse-quentlyasked our Groups to decline any cotation.· . . • -We
. therefore kindly beg you to· adopt a. similar_ attitude. • . ..
Notdoubtingthat you wiil agree with our point of-view and;
with anticipa~ed thanks,·we·beg y~u (etc.)-. •• 1113
'

Even·within

'

· · the formal·· structure. of the ISC, the· founder--members joined
together in opposition to · the re'st, and in particular to ·the
'_'Central European Grouplf (ZEG) composed of Poland (after 1935)
· . and Czechoslovakia (after 1936) ,· which also represented the
·.remaining· central. Eu{opean producers. . In the, words of a.
former ··mertlber of t:he Czech ISC delegation, "The:" founder.

.

.

.

-

I

.

members ·viewed (the ZEG members) . •· •. as small states are viewed
by great powers_ i_n politics. ". 14 . . The Czechs had-r.eason to -rue
-this fact after the detachment of the Sudetenland, which
-normally . absorbed 40% of 'total domestic' steel· sales.

The .

I

I

l
I

'

German group_ agreed to accep_t only 360,000 tons from Czech
. prod:uction, distrib:uting th~ remainder. of its former Share

I

j

I

between the western European pa,rtrters ~ - Czech. protests were
"

.

'

.

.

-

in vain.· _Meyer· emphasized -the ·extreme. seriousness of. the
unemployment situation in Luxemburg, d'Heur made a similar
remark regarding .Belgium, and the French and British delegates
remained siien;.1s
There can be no·doubt concernirigthe fact that byl939
. the Ruhr had won considerabie acceptance fromthe·producers

·I

I
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of Great Britain.and.the Continent for 'its leadership and
methods of industrial organization~· The so-ca.lled. l'Diisseldorf
Agreement" concluded by the-heads of the British Federation
·of Industries and Reichsgruppe Industrie on 16 March 1939, the
·day·after the Germari March on Prague, ·is· freq-uently:cited
as.the.high-water mark of !'industrial appeasement."

It

called for nothing less than the creation of a·comprehensi:ve·
network of •.international .• cartel•. agreements underpinned by.
domestic economies •. fully regulated. by producer associations.
The Anglo-German coal and steel discussions are.what led to
this outcome •.

To quote the·remarks of Mr. Stanley, President

of the Board of Trade, as paraphrased in The Times of 22
February 1939:

''The· coal trade talks had been invaluable

.precursers· to the wider. talks,. which were . now to start. · . From
them we could draw many lessons. and much encouragement. · No
·onewho had ·taken part •in_the coal trade talks would.expect
that the•industrial·talksof next month cou1a.·be brought to
a successful conclusion in a few hours or.days.

They had

learned that negotiations of that nature required.some com•.parable organization on both.sides of the table.

The German

coal industry for many years had enjoyed a form of central·
'

.

'

organization, and it was bnlywhenthecoal industry here
al~o organized itself,on a more centralized basis that· progress
'

'

became really practicable.

If thes~ industry talks were to

succeed over a wide field•our industries must. adopt for themselves some .form of organization which would enable• e·ach one·
of them to speak with onevoice~ ... · It might be [possible]

l

I
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· to look back. upori• [recent and impending] events . ~. as a
;;

turning point not ~nly in the progress of the coal trade

. . .,

.not only inthe·methods of Anglo-German industrial.relations,
but also in· the. history and hopes of the world .• " 16
· . Ruhr industry·, policy during the period. of· the. occupation,
· frorri May 19.40 to September 1944, ·reflected the strength of
the Interessengemeinschaft'built upin WesternEurope, and-.
including Britain, ·during the'.1930s.
maintaining continuity.

It aimed above·a:11 at

The·coal and .steel industries of

France and Benelux werenot,to be destroyed but enabled to
do business as in. the past ... --that•is, to the,,extent possible
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

under.new. conditions~. Naturally,.. there were ·compromises.
They were usually motivated .by fear of. German competitors.·
Nonetheless, the

0

war aims" of the Ruhr· ,were moderate~

Steinbrinck, the R.uhr-based administrator of· heavy industry
in· Belgium·and North.France; brought the latter into a kind
of •~junior partnership'" with . the Ruhr...

The Ruhr· leadership

· advocated a similar. policy with regard. to the minette areas.
And, thanks to the readiness of the conquered to collaborate
economically and the high material requirements of 'Hitler's
war efforts, relationships:such as·those the Ruhr had in rni'rid
by and .large were the rule.inthe.whole of.the !'Occupied
Western Territories."
The destruction of France in May and June 1940 provided
.

..

.

an ideal opportunity, if .one had ever presented itself,. for
the Ruhr to wrench. markets from the hands ·of its·competitors,
expropriate them through forcible rnerger,.lirnit their. pro.;..
duction by', directive or denial of access to raw niateri.als, ·
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or simply remove machinery and plant.

But neither.the written

"war aims" proposals nor the discussions animating them gave
serious con~ideration to the~e possibilities~

They were

rc!,ther.sober-to.the point.of.being unimaginative.

The main

.issue debated in Ruhr coal circles was whether pre-war re. lationships should be built ,upon or simply reso-t:.red. · "Zur
Neuordnung der europaischen Kohlenwirtschaft, 28.8.40".points
'

•

....

4

-

· to th·e ·need- for a single West European coal syndicate to
-centralize sales. on international markets,·eliminate tariff
and quota barriers, promote mechanization, coordinate.invest.-_
ment,. and compensate·•... for the effects· ~f currency· revaluations
and differences in tax structure.

This was~ however, a

minority view~ · The pos.ition of the industry, as· expressed in
.

· a letter of 3 September 1940

. .

.

from Herr

'

..

Ernst Russel, foreign

·trade chief of RWKS;-to Reichswirtschaftsminister·Funk.was
less ambitious.

Its main concern-was to restore, with slight

· •. quota c.hanges, and .if possible ev~en .·strengthen, the . understanding. reached with Great Britain inl938-1939.

A Denkschrift

written as background to it therefore emphasized" ... es·ware

II

doch dringend erwiinscht und·m.E. notwendig, dass van der

I

I

.englischen Seite die·Schaffung der notwendigen Voraussetzungen
.

. fur. e1ne ••• klare und einfache Regelung, d. h. ein· Zusammenschluss ..
des englischen Bergbaus und der.englischen-Koksindustrie·
gefordert und sicher.gestellt wird mit der Auflage, dass die
englische Regierung. dann alle- notwendigen Schritte . tun wird,
'

. ,um

.

'

'

,

.

zu veranla~sen, daS de~ englische Bergbau. sicb zu einer

Verstandigungmit der 'deutschen Bergbauindustrie· tatsachlich.
zusammenfindet."17

With.regard to.the coal.districts'of .the

.
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Nether_lands, Belgium and North France, the industry advocated,
strengthening the regulative powers of producer organizations
.on· dpmestic markets.

. Exports would, however, be sold throgh

an RWKS-dominated comptoir, in theory so as to create savings
. ·from· more ef•ficient routing, of shipments •.•. The "war aims" of
steel was discussed at

a 10

May meeting of the'"KleinerKreis;"

the inforinal industry direc::totate •. · The steel leaders,·a~_sq
· called for

11 • -~

.eine .Wiederherstellung der al_tb.ewa.hrten

freundschaftlichen Zusarmnenarbeit mit der deutschen Stahl'

'

industrie wie. in den Jahreri 1926-1939, ·also Schaffung einer
. Art. Westeuropa.ischen Stahl union" 18. · Once again·, lo.cal· carteLs
were t:o. be.strengthened and allowed 'j:o exercise full authority
on dome.stic · markets but required cto export · through a German
-• cartel,. the ·. Stahlwerksverband. ·
Before proceeding any further,-it is necessary:to describe
·the setting• for, the politics of coal and steel in occupied·_.
'

Western Europe.

'

One feature of it was .that part of Hitler's

strategy,.which: dictated destruction of France as a national
unit •. A second one was the struggle 'for position between
the Gauleiterof Essen and.the Saar, each championing the
industry in his· jurisdiction.,

And, finally·,· there .was a

"free-for-all":·strtiggle: for posi1:ion •between· the heavy indus. tries of the · Ruhr and the· Saar and the/Reichswerke.

To turn,·

first, .to.th~ territorial settlement, the former Reichsland
ElsaS-Lothringen:Cinc],uding the.steel ·industryof the French
· departement · of Moselle} . was annexed _and. put· under· the authority
. of Gaulei ter Jo:sef Bilrckel of· Saar-Pfalz. . A so~called
demarcation line divided.the government in :Vichy. from the

I
I
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.

.

~

-

.

remaining heavy,iildustry'departements·of~he,North and East.
•Movement of labor across it was·largely impossible·during·the
first year of··occupation, and·it eased only gradually thereafter..

The departements of. Nord. and Pas-de'."'Calais were, for

their part, administered from Brussels by the Military Governor.·
. · of Belgium and North France.·- . Belgium remained territorially
intact, save for a few .adjustments along the German berger_~ as
did the Netherlands which, however, was_governed as a
Reichskommissariat.by Arthur Seyss-Inquart.·
_like Al_sace-Lorraine, · was annexed.

The Grand Duchy,

Gaulei ter. Simon of Trier

· was largely responsible for the conduct of its civil. affairs.
-

-

.

.

.

In steel and coal matters too,_. the proximity of German adminis.

tration varied by area.

.

.

.

.

.

·The foundries in· annexed· areas;

·Luxemburg.and.Lorraine ·(:the ·French departement ·Moselle}, were
.

.

'

.

'

.

.

0

. slated for a direct German pre sence in, some :·form .or other.'

·rn

the occupied a:r~as ·Belgium, the Netherlands' and F,~ance (both.
the North and the.non-annexed minette departements), indirect
.administration, through local producer organizations, was to
be the·rule. 19
The determination of "spheres of influence'' between Ruhr
and Saar was the result of·a contest o:ff st~engths'.between the
xGauleiter .·of E:ssen, ·-Terboven, and his counterpart in the Saar..:.
Pfalz, Burck.el.•_ Terboveri·hoped initially to install his candi- .
.· date, - Otto Steinbrinck, as hegemon in the entire area.

The

- latter had enjoyed a spectacular rise in power,·. one apparently . • ·
less -due to his background as· a much-de.co!ated submarine ·
. captain '-in World War Iarid long .association with Friedrich Flick

I

I

I
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than to his.office·as General in·the.SS Reserve.

He, -together

with_ Terboven, administered the . Vereinigte .. Stahlwerke shares
of Fritz Thyssen, who had fled the Reich,and servecl as Acting

·He was also due· to-. be elected

Chairman of the Board after 1941.

Chairman of-the Rheinisch;..Westfalisches Kohlensyndikat when
-hostilities intervened.

In early May 1940,>Steinbrinck•was
'

'

'

·. - named (;eneralbeauftragte:r: fiir die• Eisen- und Stahlindustrie in
·Belgium, North France, and the district of Longwy.

Thanks to

Biirckel_' s oppo~ition, the· area: of "Meurthe:-et-Moselle..-Siid,"
·. - which contained the bulk· of. the French steel industry,- came under •
the jurisdiction. of GeneralbeauftragterHermann Roehling~
Steinbrinck immediately turned to the business of setting
- up produc.ers in his .area ·to function as -junior partners of
· Reich _heavy industry.

This _imtol ved. endowing .. pre-war cartels,

where they existed, with the authority to enforce raw materials
rationing and alloc·a~e German orders.

In other cases, new

machinery< had to be set .up to discharge ·these functions.

· In ·

steel, -only minor adjustments were required .. · "Cosibel" became
· "Sybelac" (Syndicat belgede-1"--Acier), with membership
compulsory for all producers.

The-~6mpto1.r Siderurgigue de'

·- France underwent a · similar change and· was· re;.:.named ·. II Co rs id" -(Gomite d 'Organisation -Siderurg ique -de. France).

The leader-

ships of both•cartels ·remained unchanged. 'Th~·pre-war Belgian_
coal cartel, .or -rather cartels, was drastically centralized,
.

-.

-

. the Federation des Associations Cha:tboriniers becoming the_ . ·
· ,,Office Belge des Charbons in the ·process~:. A new Office Belge
'

<.deis Cokes was attached

to
'

'

'it. _.·- In North France the pre:-war
.-

coal cartel was incorporatedinto "COH," Comite.d'Organisation

,

I

!

'
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des Houillieres}.

A'newcartel was created ,for the mines

of Dutch Limburg. •. Th'l,ls similar coal and steel cartels were
·set up·by Stelnbrinck·in each district of the "Occupied
Western·Territories, 112 1
The annexed territories· and "Meurthe;..et-Moselle-Sild".were
the. scene of

a

"·free~for:...all" ·in. which German interests. battled

one. another fqr the :right to disposess the French arid _B~lg_ia,n
owners.. · The Reichswerke Hermann Goring was the leading ,heavy:weight: contender.

Paul Pleiger/ the man in· charge of its des-

tinies,. intended· nothing less than for it .to become the dominant
Montang·esellschaft in, the Reich.

As of 17 May 1940, its rated

raw.steel capacity of.5.2 million tons per year was 17% of the
R.eich total,· as compared to the 8. 96.·million tons per year of
Stahlunion~

His goal was to acquire an additional 14.6 million.

tons per year of capacity,, thus attaining:a.dominant position.,

I
l

Suc.h gains were expected to have counterparts in· coal.

Where

they would come from is, however, anything but clear. · In coal,
the Reichswerke was simply "out for what it could get. 1122

!

\
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As for .the second contestant, Hermann Roehling,.
his family
.
.

.

.

had founded and managed the ,.Roehling' sqhe Eisen- und Stahlwerke ..
for' several generations. ·• It was only one of the. two important
foundries of the·saar, and therefore

of secondary importance,

in the·overall.politics of '.the·steel industry.- Rochling's
relationship with.the Ruhr was a difficult one, complicated
in part by the vehemence of his personal.nationalism~

He

detested. the de, Wendel.• family, . which had Ruhr interests, not·
only as an.agent of French influence·in the politics of

I

j

j

I

·I

·I
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language in the border area ·but because. in 1919 ·±t had taken
over the Rochling;...founded Karlshutte, Thionville.

At.the

. same time; the Roehling firm--.~inside the. French customs area
. until. 1935---had important client a.nd banking relationships
',

· .·

·

. · 23

·

. 1.n France~- · . Hermann's francophile first cousin; Ernst .
.

.

.

.

. .

Roehling., handled these interests froin a. Paris office.
~Behling e>wed his prominence after. 1933 in part. to techl)ic_al
·.. expertise. · In early 1937, he addressed letters ·to Hitler
. and Goring aavocatingthe creation of a steel industry based.
on the constnnption· -of low-:-grade domestic ores, and later
.

.

claimedcredit forbeing the.intellectual father of the:
Fouz: Year Plan •.

Speer would,in fact appoint him. Chairman of

· Reichsvereinigung Eisen in June 19.42.

In Summer 1940, he
·
.
24
was prominent, however/ mainly as a z ealo:us germani z er.
-And.as for.theRuhr?. InearlyJuneRWM-chief Funk took
.

.

. the precaution of:warningitto refrain froinAnnektationsgeluste.:..---being too greedy-~-, which was feared especially on
the part of those firms who. had lost holdi~gs in the ar~a ·. ·
~fter 191& •.. The only interest to exhibit sue~ behavior,
however, lacked prior involvement there; it•was Friedrich Flick •.
· The particular object of •his desires was the Laurent foundry,
-Rombacher Huttenw'erke/SA Acieries de Rombas.

The firm had

formerly belonged to the operationally defunct firm of.earl
Spaeter. · Flick'. s claims on the .property· were, so utterly
specious that· the other big Ruhr. steel. i.nte.rests suspected.
· him of having made a secret deal with Goring..
.

good precedent:. for. such, fears.

There was a·

..

.In 1937 he had· exchanged his
.

I
I

I
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holdings in_Harpener:Bergbau AG and Essener Steinkohle---two
important-mines"7--for the more remunerative lignite properties
formerly,.owned by the "'non-Aryans"_ Julius and .Ignaz Petschek.
And Flick.would.in £act continue to pursue a policy of "free'
--

- -

- - _- -25

hands II with regard to. Western "E:llrope.

The ambitions-of- the remaining-Ruhr·producers were ·modest-·
· by· comparison tb Flick' s, at least if judged' by the. mem9ra_pda
·,

_which -Ernst Poerisgen, 'Chairman of "the Board of Vereinigte
·Stahlwerke, asked eac:::h to compile in the-event of an actual
re-distribution ref foundries in_ Lorraine arid Lwcemburg. _·
Heesch' s is little more _than perfunctory;·- Direktor von Bruck._. explained that h±s: firm· would. prefer._ not to· invest heavily. in·
-the· renovation qf its:Dortmund works but feared,that its other
operations ·wguld suffe·r unless additional capacity could_ be
. ·brought on _line~_ "The solution? --Acquire ARBED!:

"Es sind

- - aiso rein produktlonstechnische Gesichtspunkte,· die,·uns den

.

.

Erwerb wilnschenswert ersc::heinen lassen wilrden.

U:nter Zugrund~-

legung diese~ p;oductionstechnischenErwagungen wiirde die
· Arbed uns _am. geeignetsten erscheinen, -die in unserem Fert.~gungs- programm bestehenderi _Luck~n- · ausfilllen · bzw. Neuirivesti tionen
· zti ersparen. " 2 6 : · So- weak -was the presentation of Hoe~ch

's

- claim that the ·Director of·concordia"Bergwerke-AG, a,secondary
.

.

mine once owned by the Spaeter itnerests, o"ffered- to lend his·
!'moz-al authorityll to a joint effort.

-Direktor Kellermann of

GutehOffnungshiitte ,. also - Chairman of RWKS, actually obj.ected
· t~Poensgen's request forthe presentation_of claims.

He-

;drafte~_amemorandum enumerating them· only-after.being assured
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that all_ the other'·big firms had already done so~

In it,

GHH asked only for
the
additions ne-eded · to maintain parity ·
l
.
. .
. between German producers, reasoning that th±s would require
adding 600,009.t'.ons of rated capacity to GHH's present 1,383
million tons. _- •- T.he only foundry . that was neither_ too small· nor · .large and ~o which no German>finn-could_claim prior ownership
was ·Micheville, ·1n Longwy ... --· GHH therefore requested special
'

consideration wi.th ·regard· to acquiring it.

Two other firms

which had, and would continue to, make huge acquisitions
elsewhere apparently did notdemonstrate an interest. in the
m.:inette area. -. One of them, Mannesmann, was in .any case deeply
involved in the a,cquisition

ot Prager Eisenwerke, a major

., producer of pipe and therefore an· interwar · compe.titor·. _The inactivity of the other one, Krupp,:puzzled even Ruhr industry.
These firms; rather tha_n ,_f_lick must <'.be considered as re.

.

'

:

.

..

.

presentative of .Ruhr policy in.Lorraine and Luxemburg.
. approach

Their•

at any rate, adopted by the "Kleiner Kreis. 11

W9-S,

-On_ 7. June, Poensgen issued .a circular denoting i:t:

1;

No transfer of either mine or foundry property
until after the.rest~ration of,peace, _unless
outside·interestsmake.p:rior claims.
'

2.

I

-

·,

'

•

•

'

Prior'± ty of_ access to minette. should go to the
·firms .o:f: the ar_ea {Lorraine, Luxemburg, and
- the Saar);·- and, if a surplus remains, t_he Ruhr_-should be_ guaranteed the right ·-to make. ·use of ·
it.

2

?-
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3.

.

After restoration of: peace; acquisition preference
.

-

~

.

.

.

'

.

.

.

.

.

shouldbe.accorded·prior German owners.
4.

Unexploited ore properties, in the event they.· are
not returned.to former owners, should.be administered.
28
jointly by. a consortium of German steel Producers~

On 7 August.-Poensgen issued a second circular, this one ·
ext>ressing his llperson:a:1: plans'' for io:traine;,..Luxemburg ·:i,n .:. ·
the · event of. German military victory. - · . With regard to minette:
producers in the areamustbeguaranteed accessto·sevent.y-five.
years of·supply before outsiders. are allowed to lay claim to
dispositicm of reserves.

Belgium should be guaranteed a supply

· adequate, to meet her. normal requirements,.' 6 million t'ons per
year.

Ore sales must,. as, previously; be coordinated with

·· coke deli verie·s: to the. area.

'. ,u rationalization"

With regard. to .f oundrie's:.

should· be introduc~d and factories• elimiriated,

·with less than,600,000 tons of annual.capacity.

Thereafter,

.integrations with. German- firms should be ·allowed only when,
justified by criteria of cost efficiency.

Above all; he con.

.

.

sidered i t " .. ~opportune to leave in place traditional relationships with western markets."

He was, in short> prepared

to offer . the producers of -the area_ "junior. partnerships II in
· ., ·
• · ' ·. ·
29
... · whatever arrangements might ultimately be· arrived at. ·
· ·. The . Ruhr emerged the
victor in the policy dispute· with
.
.

,.

-

.

.

.

.

..

-

t,he·Reichswerke andRochlingalbeit at the·cost of continuous
.

'

struggle and. s~bstantiai concessions. - . There was to. _be, · first
·of. all, no wholesale confiscation of. property or· removal of
per~onnel ·or, machinery without prior assent of the F_ranco..;
Belgian owners . . All.enterprises were to be administered on·

I
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a "business-like· basis."

Trustees•· (Treuha.nder) were .appointed ·

for each foundry, it beipg understood•that they would receive.
· purchase priority after the war.
in the hands of the owners •.

Mine management remained ·

A.new, German-run·consortium.

was, however, set up to distribute minette, the Liefergemeinschaft fur Erzgruben in Lothringen und Meurthe..;;et-Moselle.
Paul<Raabe,

a Flick

associate, administered it.· TheRutr.

nonetheless.· fared. comparat:i vely ill as regards the assignment
.

of trusteeships, wh.ich was as follows:
•·Work
. ·.. A.
0

1.

·30

Previous Owner

Trustee·

Lorraine ·
Karlshtitte

Haut Fourneaux et.

. Rochlingsche Eisenund Stahl~~rke~ Saar

Acieries de Thionville
·(Laurent)·
. 2 •.

.. 3.

Kneuttingeri

..

:soci~te: Metallurgiqu~·
. Knutange

•·· Kloecknerwerke,.
Duisburg

.·

Ucklng_en ·

Forges et Aci~ries
. ··des Nerds et·· Lorraine

Neunkircher Eisenwerk·
· (Stumm) , Saa:r

4 • . Rombach/Machern

·s .A •.des Acieries
deRombas

Friedrich Flick KG,
Berlin·

5. · Hayingen-Moevern/

tes Petits~Fils des
F. de Wendel

Reichswerke ·
Herman Goring·

6.
. B.

Hagendingen-SAFE

· .Ul'MI

·Luxenburg·

1. ·· Rodingen,
·. 2.

"HADIR"

J.

"ARBE:O"

S.A. d'Ocigree-Marihaye

Gemeinschaft Faust/
Hahl

Soc. Gen-controlled

Vereinigte.Stahlwerke

II

---

"
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Neither Roehling nor Goring was satisfied with this·
.division of influence .. 'R5_chling _nonetheless. grudgingly•·
accepted it, while objecting bitterly, for instance, to
Kloeckner I s ·receipt· of · a trusteeship fo-r · the Kneuttingen
works. · He feit that the sons of. the man who built them,
. -_:Peter Kloeckner, were "unworthy as hi~ father.' s heir. I' · Al'.ld.
as for Flick' s mandate for Rombach, · it was nothing less.,_ ._
·
·
·
·
·
· · · · 31
·. , than " ••• a detraction from my person.II . .·•"Das. Motto fiir· die bisherige Werksverteiiung," he wrote .Paul Korner on
24?anuary.1941 " ..• konrite laut~n: Wer seit 1914 gekampft,.
,

.

'

.

.

.

gesiegt, und Verdienste hat, bekommt nichts.

Wer weder

. gekampft,·
noch
geopfert, .dafiir .aber verdient· hat, bekommt. ·
..
.
. ·Nach dieser S.chlacht mul3 .aber ini Westen der .• Helm noch_ fester
·. gebunden werden. · Das kann·man doch>nur mit. Kampfern, nicht
. -·aber. mit·· Ha'"n·d1e·rn· mac·hen.· 1132
.·_. .. . . Every th'1.ng, .h e ·._. argue d., ·
II

absolutely.·. everything, speaks against. allowing subpartici- .
.

.

pat.ions to Franco-Belgian proprietors who ... ·. after 1871 sat.
·.
33
· in their fine chateaux and made anti-German propaganda."
While. conniving, secretly wi_th Gauleiter Biirckel for the
attachment of Longwy-Briey into the Reich_, he ordered his .
. subordinates to behave "• ~ .. de fa on qu I apres la guerre

1

· tout·· temps nous -pourrons nous . mettre
.

.

.

a

a.

nouveau ,· a la meme
. 34

table· avec ·1es messieurs franco-belges.". ·
.

.

The frustrated ambitions o"f the Reichswerke centered on
ARBED~-

They precipitated a struggle of great intensity

which, while futi·le, ehded only with German defeat. • It was
. waged at every level of finance and politics •. · The Chief of

30

Civil Adrrdnistration, Gauleiter Simon,- was the Reichswe.tke' s -,
single.most formidable opponent~ .He recognized that its
annexation of ARBED _would.be_ followed by.· his own replacement.·
-

'

..

He deluged the-Reichskarizlei:with protests of such attempts
and.cross~checked wherever p6ssible thos~ to exercise control
.

~

.

.

.

.

· over. ARBED' s personnel policy. ·- The, Deutsche Bank was a
second formidable- opponent. · It .-turned back repeated CclII}P~~gns
of .the Reichswerke ' s banking . connection,_ .• the . Dre sdner, to
acquire, by.force.if necessary, a,blocking minority •(Sperr-_
minoritat) from the Societe. Generale·.

One consequence of.

this defense was a reinsul:'a.nce·agreement·betweenthe Societe
Generale' and the Deutsche Bank pledging .each to promote .the
'

'

interests of the-other regardless of the outcome of the war.
The Ruhr .was the Reichswerke.• s>third formidable opponent,
and iri :this struggie it· :cquld als_o: depend·. on the cooper.ation· ·
of Roehling .. ·. The two shared the trusteeship of. Rodin.gen,
which was pla·ced under the cornrnissarial _administration of
'' • • • two abl'e young men··. with mopey behind them . • • who
,

,

,

- deserve a. chance' II "Herren Faust' 'a former , Roehling, employee' and Hahl, a Stednbrinck crony.

The Ruhr failed to block the

appointment of a'.Reichswerke manager, State Secretary

·Konigs, as Verwa.iter, of ARBED~

It did, •however, _manage

to keep him powerless ... The p·owers of -the Generalversamrnlung
(stockholders' meeting) remained intact.- One actually met
in 1943 ~ · 50,000 of 25_0, 000 shares, the pre-war average, were
represented •. The Societe Gen·erale -~oted. 38,000 ,of- them.
Aloys :Meyer remained· Ge:neraldirektor _of the. firm.·, ARBED was
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.

.

.

a member afte·r October .1940 of Bezirksgruppe Sudwest der
.

.

.

-

.

Wirtschaftsgruppe Eisenschaffende Industrie, along with the
.

'

.

.

.

'

.

.

.

.

Saar, and, ·after 1942, of ReichsvereinigungEisen.

Its

relationship with its subsidiaries in the Reich .was· unchanged.

.

.

.

.

.

'

and in ·fact it was tr.eated throughout the war
. other.German. firm.u 35

like. any .

II • • •

The inability of: the German economy to fulfill the~ demands
.

·.

.

.

'

:

· · of Hitler's war effort. is what brought i:o .an end the period of
"free~for:-all."
terminal date~

It is difficult to assigri it a·precise
On 26· Aug~st 1940·: Goring ordered

,i~ ••

the

systematic and. thorough·exploitation of the productive capaci-.

:

.

.

.

.

.

.

-

.

.

ties. and raw materials. of ,the· Occupied Western Territories ...•·
especially mines; . foundries, rolling mill~~· .. and key components .
·

. .

36

industries." .·

·

·

· The directive. by rio means.·· ended . the interventions ·

of party figures into·.th~ economy of the--area.·
however, ··book few successes.

They Col,lld.,
·,

Burckel sought·. in vain· to

incorporate the minette properties of· Lorraine into -~ new
· . ·company, "Westmark ,II which. was to be. under the. control of his·
Gau.

II

-1

I
I

j

Nei.ther h~ nor Gau:leiter Simon of Trier~ who was also.·
.

.

Chief of Civil Administration·· in Lux~urg, managed to a ttac~
·. Longwy"'"'.Briey ·to his jurisdic:tion.
.

.

On 31 · May 1941 General van
.

.

· Hanneken, steel_ chief in the Reit:hswirtschaftsministerium,
ordered
all·. discussion
of· prop·erty
.transfer tb cease until.
.
.
.
·the.conclusion -of peace. · The overriding purpose c,f German
P,olicy after -this. date was. to step up,steel ,:production.

.The·

·. · .expa:pding. sc_ope of the war; then,·. safeguarded. the autonomy ..
···of the industry of t:he. area. · ·It·· admitted· of. no> choice -except
t

I

I
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'

'

. to; wor]{ through iocal: ind~stry~. Thus the operation of the
· · cartels · set up by Steinbrinck was extended . throughout the ·
· "Occupied Western Ter.ri tories. " 37 ·
It 'did in fact, prove possible for West European. coal and.·
steelmen to. do business· in the New Order if· no·t

II

i

. I

as Usual, 11 then

I

at. least on a· basis. which,· under prevailing. cond.i tions,. can ..
• be described •as satisfactory •.. Fir~tt of all, the busine§lSll!en
-

-

.

.

·. of the. occupied territqries · enjoyed: certain advantages from
their9wngovernments .. The French Government at Vichy,·the
King and ,the Secretaries General in Belgium, the Secretaries
General·in the
Netherlands, andtheGbvernments-in-Exile of
.
.

.

.

'

.

'

· the two Low Countries (at least forthe first six months of
the occupation) were· a.11 committed' in principle to the idea
of ec~ne>mic ,collaboration~·. Each. sought, in short/ to safeguard
.

-

·.

. .

-

.

the· national interest . by working for the.·war effort of the'
Reich..
11

As was the case there,. the business communities in the.

0ccupied.Western.Terri:tories"·served.as agents of public.

policyand,·in turn,·could call on the aid .of governm.ent~l
. a-qthority.. when desired.

The governments ·•of .. the area gave

their sanction to ·a. :spate of· measures which, iri very ·direct.
fashion, promoted. the interests of industry.: · First~ the
.

·'

.·

.

-

-

,·

-

..

·.·. French goverilment and the senior. civil: servants of Belgium and
the Netherlands enacted"legislation, paralleling that of the
·. German occupation ordnances,which create·d the orga.n.izations ·
'

'

to distribute raw ma:te~ial.to industry--theComites·d'Organi_:
..

.

.

.

-

.

-

.

sat.ion :in France, Offices centraux de Marchandisein Belg~um,
and the Rijksbureauxin the Netherlands~

They acted·in.thiis
j
'

'

·1'

.l
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respect.as agents.of long-pursued.policies,of the Societe
Generale in Belgi~, heavy industry circles. in France, ·and
.large domestic producers in the Netherlands •. Second, each
state put .its authority behind payments. systems .created to
.· channel personal savings .into the financing . of German order
placement to local industry.· Each.also supported the a~tempt
_of·. the Occupy.ing Power to·:maintai,n in· operation a system of
.

.

wage and.price freez~s which, in practice, applied only to
the.former. ,·Finally, each paid out production subsidies
of unprecedented magnitude •. These measures offset at·least
·in part the disadvantages: of German rule. 38 ·
..

In Belgium, heavy,industry followed the "Politics of
Production~I'- the local variant of economic collaboration, from.
start to finish.

The appoinbnent in June 1942 of Herman Rochl:i,ng

- as Rei'chsbeauftragter fiir dle>Eisen-• und Stahlindustrie· im
besetzten Westeuropa·and the proposals of the.Baron.de Launoit,
· the chief .of the Banque de Belgiqµe: complex, were the only
... breaks. in it.

·An atm9sphere of Korrektheit prevailed in the

relations - between foundrymen and the del·egates -of the Occupying
Power. - Steinbrinck was in fact socompietely ,faithful to Ruhr
iridustry :policy that. ·the charge• of• "Plunder of the Occ,:upied _
Territories ,11 which he faced_ at Nih:~nberg -in the

II Flick

trial,"

had to be dropped~_ Representatives of virtually every_Belgian
foundry testified.to his good conduct!· Rochling's_ mission as
- Reichsbeauftragt·er was to step up the production ·of armaments
.

.

.

grade s.teels: at whatever. cost he ::deemed necessary •. He ·therefore disregarded the order placetneri.t niachineryof-"Sybelac,"

I
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: :directed factories to introduce a new method of -his- own_
invention- for· manu~acturing high -grade steels· -from ._the Thoma.s
process, and pushed to the_m:aximum the smelting of electrichearth steel.

Kommissare were. appointed with' Bel.gian agreement

to supervise the,installationand use of the expensive and
increasingly irreplaceable carbide electrodes-required by
the latter.

'Although Roehling tried to be
'

-

II

amiable' II tl;les_e '

-

-_ tasks necessarily raisedthe·hackles of Belgian steelmen.

They

. grudgingly undertook the new manufactures, however, in the
meantime dreaming of the -better days under Steinbrinck·. 39
'

'

Baron de Launoit ·.h'ad a much deeper commitment to -economic
-collaboration than did the Societe Gener ale.•· -He was, in the '

-

words of-Kurt Freiherr von_Schroeder,-a veritable

11 Eurovisionary."

- His mind was· fertile wi:th ideas for Belgo-German cooperation ·
-- · in the -fields _of. chemicals, electri6. power~· canal. construci:ion,
and heavy industry. - His ma.in steel -firm•, Qugree~Marihay_e' --_entered a· convention with -Otto Wolff of Koln to set up a

-

jointly run firm to sell its_exports, along with those of-~

rema:ining_segmentof the Belgian industry, on world.markets.
de Launoit ·also proposed to the-Dresdner Bank the set up of
a--50/50 holding company in which· his_ and_ t.he Societe Generale's
-shares of ARBED, -Rodange~· Chiers,_ Thy-le-ChSteau, and the ·
Campine mines, -~ould be- pooled •. The Belgians were to· receive
.

-

'

.

.

-

.

'

Ruhr .mining shares as compensation. _._The Societe Generale,
however; frustrated these plans. - Undaunted, ·de Launoi t set
. up on 2 F~bruary 1941 ·a:"'.••• secret and_. private: bureau- in
-'Brufina I to -study possible ·-fields - of -collaboration' with the

35
:· . . . .

·.

• Dresdner~
ir

.

.

.

'

·,

'

'

.:

..

He_ even met with its representative, Dr. Rasche_,

in March 1943. -to discus~- them.

German military reverses did

-: - . : .

not, in short, quench his zeal.

40

·

· The ore fields, - foundrie·s and coal mines of pre-:-war
· ·-. -France-~~where operations; especially in •the. East, .had been
•

'

•

••.••

r

•

•

•

'•

•'

•

disrupted by battlefield events, politlcal divi.sion,, nazi
language -::t'.acial politics; and a punitive attitude on·- tbe.:part

i

of riazi o~fi'cialdom--,;.emerged from the war-in• surprisirigly, goodshape.

There r.-,a~,- first of:all, at .no time a shortage of

· miri.ette, · and therefore no -need to_· pursue policies of Raubbau. ,
-

.

·.

.

.

.

.

In the annexedareas·of Lor:i:::ai:ne, the trustees'_ presumption of
. eventual takeover of the foundries meant·, "at the very least,
· that every, effort 'wa.s.made to ke.~p plant operating normally. ·"
At Rombach, .Flick made heavy inves~ents _and the firm· was in•
,

•

C

<

: excellent condition after the· war. · Jacque$,·Laurent-, · the
-.French owner, · described its -German: production manager as ·
' .. follows: :·_. __

II • • •

il s' est,. comporte dans. ses fonctions vis

a

vis

du-_ personnel. et de la Direction francaise avec une · moderatio_n
-etune reelle: comprehension des -circoristances exceptionelles ...

IL a- fait tout_ses- efforts pour:aider les ingenieurs
.

,_

.

'

..

. frangaises d~ Rombas a repatri~r · 1·eurs meubles .• _.. au_ moment ··
.

.

des_ expulsions au-mois d'a.aftt et au_mois de:novembre 19,40";
· il a: fait.'_de louable ~ffcirts:pour s'Opposer.le d~part de·
nombreux .lorrains . 'et notamment>du pers.Onnel: ouvrier·s et '

employes..

.

Jiai notamment le temoin de la p·osition cqurageux

P.r-ise_ par lul ,~- ce- sujet vis. a vis. des autorites nazis
-- . ·Charg~es d'es . expulsions~:':' 41 In Lon~y and North -France-,..
,

- .I

areasunderSteinbriri.ck's jurisdiction, conditions were essen.

.

.

.

tially. similar t~ those ·prevailing in: Belgium ..
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Elsewhere in France·, _and· notably i:n its most: important
ste~l dis•trict, "Meurthe~et...:Moselle-Sud, 11 two. considerations
' are b~hina· this surprisingiy, favorable outcome: . the existence,. ·
.

.

- - first,· of pre-war. busines_s. relaticmships _and,· second,· the
·belief of·. s~me technocrats-. and industrialists .in the efficacy
•- of German. business-methods• and leadership._· .Figures. -like_
Bichelonne.and Francois Lehideux; far- from being passiv~ ~xecu..

·,

tors -of German policy, -were intent -to demonstrate' th.at colla.

.

.

boration.was a workable,iong...;term appr9ach to economic_ policy.
They_generally took the-initiative in coal-and steel policy.
.

'

vis -~ vis the Reich.

Their proposals, howev_er, ·- elicited
.

.

.

:

..

.

-

.

~

· little reaction from Berlin prior to summer 1943_.

Until then,

the Roehling family interests-largely governed'the fates -of
42
the foundries in the district.
After '.the ·trusteeships_ had beeri harided out ·in May 1941,

of

the R6chlings pursued policies

a traditional· ch~racter ..

This; at least, was· the .vieW of M. HUinbert de -:Wendel; _the
.

,

.

.

'.

.

.·

-

-

.'

-

man whose interests Hermann Rochlinghadpledged himself to
, .destroy.

II.~.~

nous conside:rons {he testlfied)c que M. H.

Roehling ·a ·touj ours. ete un· pangermaniste de la :vieille ecole ..· .
· · Il a apporte son concours le plus entier

a

Hitler parce

.

'

a. cru. voir. en-. lui 'l 'homrne' capable de. realiser le
Uber_alles.

I

q~' il·

.

I

.

Deutschland

Maison'ne sau.:raitc~pendanti 1 assimiler aux

energumenes ·au pa;tLriazi .• .-Il eta:it l'homme de la Reich·swehr,
.
.
. .
1143
· mais · non p~s celui ·de 1a· Gestapo. . -_.__ 'He therefore I according
to .de·wendel, opposedthe·Biirckel-ordered expulsions-of
,October and November.1941 on the grounds.that they caused

i

I

loss of critical personnel,· andinade·repea.ted attempts to

1

·•,

I
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·prevent Gestapooperationsinsidethe factories under his·
supervision. ·He and his subordinates i~tervenednumerous
_
· . · . . 44
times· with police authorities on behalf of his employees.
Roehling also allowed the sieges sociaux ·. (corporate head-.:
qu~rter~) .of the fi~s un~er. his jurisdiction to -remain in·-·- .

_ operation.

-

.

To cover operating expenses. he indeed assigned
'

them.-a percentage, of gross receipts:on sales.
arrang~ments ·varied somewhat by firm ..
typical example.

.

'

The specif.Led

,.,.·,

',

'

Homecourtprovides_a

on

Its siege. social -'.received 4% commission

"free sales,"'.a-3% commission on sales through:the Stahlwerks. verband,

a_ 2% connnission on Thomas slag, :and .various small

I

!

connnissions. onotherby-products. -The headquarters received ..
additi6ria_l commissions ~s, sales agents and for purchases,
-

'

'

·. ~ade on behalf- of the factories. ·.These> were. nominal - functions,
· since all.sales,and purcha.ses wer(;! con<iu9ted through.either
the, cartels· or the raw materials distribµting agencies •.. Some

,

. II

, I

7. 5. million Francs was paid to the headquarters of the thr.ee
'le2crg~st foundries of l'Meurthe-et_;Moselle Sud" during the

· •>occupation. 45 ·· Th~ French_ directors had, access ·to the books
0

_·.

.

.

_-

'

.of·their firms and.could checkoperations.periodical1y.

The

Ge~an Verwalter of-Neuves-Maisons,for insta.nce;·claimed to
.- ,· be on the best of.· :terms ,with its. Director Generai, a. M. Taffenal, ·

_·,_a~d-

factory manager, M.' Thedral.

II~ • •

M. Thedral-.habitait chez ',

- moi ... M~ Thedrai etai t u~ · hote regulier et,. bienvenu, par la
suite i l mI

a rendu

egalement libr,ement yisite' . lor.squ I ~l

habitait dej~ un.· appartement du service~~ .Mes hates francaises
. etaient: sou~ent etonnees: de, voir .dans mo:n · appartemerit • 1' image•.-

.

',_

:

-

.

-

.

..

.,.

.

....

.

.
.

,.
'

.

.,

...

connu de.l'entree des troupes:alliees apres la premiere guerre
.

.

-

.

.

:

.

riiondiai'e dans Strasbourg couvert de :drapaux·.

Il va sans dire·

.
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que .je n'ai pas fait enlever.

II

IIA la fin de' men activite,1'

he continues,· " .•• M•. Thedral m'a,offert la grande 'Renault'
de ,'l 'usirie pour me permettre d I attendre men' pays • • .
dit que jiavais .rendu·de:tels service

a

(Ill m I a

l'usine que la perte

eventuelle d'une ,voi,ture, etait l~rgemerit compens~e •.• ,i 46 .
·, .Althoµgh Hermann.Rochling"cilaimed:after·the war that.he
:

'

:

~

intended at.all times to restore operational control of.th.e
. fo~dries t6 their ..owners,· .:credit in this re.spect. is probably .
due. his, cousin, Ernst •... He was responsible for maintaining
liaison with :the sieges sociaux.

The Chairman of · "Corsid, '' ·

Jules Aubrun,. said of h,im that' ,he •..• ' !'hat sich in seinen
•

<

•

•

Beziehungen mit der ·frart~c5sischen Industrie :innner als, eiri .
Mensch der Ver'sohnung. herausgestel·l
t und hat iminer. den ·.· Eindruck
.

.

'

.

.

gemacht, dal,3 ·er mit sei~em Vetter Hermann nur in<offener·
Opposition

und

.unter Zwang ~usamme~ar~eitet.
•

•

•

'

;>• 47

'His remarks

C

wererepresentativeof P:rench.industry,serttime'nt.

N:egotiations

for .~he . res ti tut ion, of· .the , f acto:ries , in .IIMeurthe-et-Moselle-Sud" ..
began, in early 1942 but faltered on the ques.tion: of finances ..

7

The firms,had acquired huge ,debts.as a-result of thedisrup-.
tions.causedby t:.he military campaigns·and ·by,an uncompensate:a
increase .·in the price ·of. ore.

In early 1942, the ·French• <state, .

I

I

l

at Bichelonne Is b,ehest~ began .payment of' generous subsidies, sane, '

!

I

. 20:.,.205 Francs,per ton, to alf French foundries 'outside of
Rochlirtg's,jurisdiction, claiming.a lack of.suffici,ent,finari0

·cial resburces to· make them there>. The Speer'.""Bichelonne co11:versations' the :Paris business conriections and' entrepreneurship
·, of Ernst Roehling, •· an(i; strang~ly enough, the Dutch state and

. II

i
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its·German representative,. one Ernst Kreuter--,;_all contributed
-· to solVing ·. the -dilemma·.
The: Dutch state·was the. source of .funds._
with a holding company;

11

They originated

Tredefina,1'. which was s_et up in 1921

with a capital of 14 milLioriGulden to finance Dutch exports
to the Reich.

.The Mendelssohn ·Bank held·controiling shares.

· on 'behalf ·of· the Dutch.-·· Various . business,. and
financial 'digni-..
.
~

1

'.taries such as F. F •. von Siemens'., Huge Stinnes, Hj almar Schacht, and Kreuter himself- held nominal:. participations in .

.

.

.

it._ -. Kreuter'- managin~ director of· "Tredif ina, ..- was -also· the
German agent of
-

Reed: and

Co. ,

the

Wall Street brokerage, house. of Dillon,
-

the major. ,underwriter of_ the huge industrial

bond issues of the late 1920s· which floated Vereiriigte Stahl~ _-.
werk.e -and IG Farben.;.
11 Tredifina"
.,•

;rn- early
-.

·it <became

1941,

'

'

-to"·repatriate .:its_:·as~ets.

i

.

.

i~possible:. for._.
.

-

.

·It was then that-•-

- the>currency• border .between Germany ,_and the Netherlands was

ot'

lifted, thus permitting·free-flow

thetwo national currencies._

I

·- -_ Specific exception- was, -however, made. in the -case of movements
from' accounts of over 100 millibn RM. -.._"Tredifina' s" - assets
.

-

were,,, in short,-- blocked. - -The Director of the Neth~rlands .
State Bank,·_. LSA Trip thereupon directed Kreuter to seek out
- investment opportunities.-,wherever possible, direct participations
-

.

.

'

'

-

.

in _private .firms~·-.- Kreuter contacted Ernst Roehling, who -then
·Wrung the assent f~omReichswirtschaftsmi:nister Funk to·

RM

de-blocking 20- million

of the total-sum.

Kreuter-and
.

.

.

.

Roehling.next-set up a-French investment-company,.the "Societe.
.

.

.

.

.

de Credits- et d-' Investissements." (SCI}~- - Kreuter became the

i

I!
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"·

.. director· and ·:Ernst RBchling along·. with a· Paris. repr~seI1tati ve . ·
of Dillon~ R'kecr sat on: the :board.

SCI Is first acquisition .·

· was · a controlling minority · in the department store . chain, · ·
·IIGalerles Lafayette."

It was attained. by a loan of30_ million
.

.

.

..

·Francs, against an option-to purchase/·fromthe· "Aubert-Harlachol
. interests

,n . which: had acquired the

II

aryanized." shares of the
.

former "Bader'sche Aktienpaket~"

.

Additional SCI·acquisitions
.

"

.cJ'

':-

-~ included bauxite .mines near· Toulon, a: railroad rolling stock·.
manufacturer, and a considerable. arriount;of Paris real estate
including the "aryanized"· ."Maison Wildenstein.11 33
80 million· RM· still: remained blocked.
~

;

.

.

'

'

.But. some·•.

To gain the_· release

of ·

.

this.sum, ErnstRochling won the agreem~tof.Speer to the_ idea·
•

•

C

'

:

•'

of· loaning it to: the French state to. subsidize foundry operations.
· in IIMeurthe-et:-Moselle Sud."

In: February 1944 this was done,

· and ~the French owners; restored to.;control of thei:r ~irms, pledged:

.... I

i

themselves to continued. collaboration:~· · The subsidies more than
offset the foundries I .opera~irig .losses and apparently were
·_ adequate ·for. amortizat_ions •.

Th~y in fact registered profit of

>101,400,00'0 Francs duri:ng the occupation.··· The figure for .those .
of France as a whole was

221, ooo, ooo· •. 48

Iri ,th_e Netherlands, Fentener- van· Vlissingen c.reated .an • ·
·• I:nteressengemeinscha.ft _linking ·a. la.rge·:part of .its industry
' to. the- Reich. •· . Details of the .specific arrangemen'ts are: obscu;re,
as-ind~ed·they,were intended

.to

be~

Each however, involved ·a

Dutch-Germarijoint venture in whi.ch· the balance ·of power
would. hinge :on the ·outcome, of the war.

They-: amounted I

in

other

.·.. words , :' to . genuine :partnerships in which ' each party exploited>
circumstance in· the mutual interest.

Th.ere was, first of all, · ·.

·.

1
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"

,,

. -

·.

,

a- new agreement in coal.

,

Th~ Staatsmijnen', which were under

· the ~up~rvision of a Goring-appointee,·· were compelled to
. sell through t.he · Steenkoieri Handelsvereeniging ,· (SHV), the
joint. RWKS/Fentener wholesaler.
. control~

With regard to. steel: ··Fentener helped the St~hlunion

a.

acqtiire

He··.then ceded them i:najority . ·.

c~ntrolling; IIiajority in• Hoog~vens, .presumably' in
.

.

-

exchange.for.deferred. compensation •. It occurred:as fol;o~s:
Ymuiden was, not re-fired .afte·r.
the·
onset of ·occupation, •. con_.
.
- ...
'

structionstopped, and a rolling.mill· was·shippedoff to,the.
. Goring.,. works
at Watenstadt.
:

-The decision to leav:e the plant

'

iqle; which.could be ·justified by ~conomic and.military;'argu-:-·
men ts' 'had the' approval 'of both the Stahluni~n ,and Fentene_r. ·.
· The latter thereupon acquired .on behalf of. the·Stahlunion the·

J million

ordinary· shares:-o'.f the_·city·of •~sterdam and the 4:.s·

•. · ·.· millio.n ordinary. and 700 ,ooo:, preference. shares of the Dutch .
, government~·

A. dummy corporation: was: set

up

to hold -49;. 6%' of

,,

'

the Stahl union's Hoogoven -ordinary shares•' .. I t held the rest ·
.

-

.

.

.

dir~ct1y· •.. A share pooling company,. Administ~atiekantoor voor
0

' Aandeeieri J<on"inklij ke Nederl~ndsche _Hoogovens 'en Staalfabrieken,
'

'

.enabled, the Stahl union to exercise effective majority control.
, It, issued non-voting• c·ertificates
-

·.-

in. exchange

for· voting shares.

' · Fentener. was-. the Chairman of the· Board. of. the Administratiekantoor.
0

·Thus the,stahlunion's contr6l of Hoogovensrested on little
.

.

-,

'

. .

.

-

'

morethari the personal·trustplaced in,Fenten~r.,

Through

Hoc,govens·, Vereinigt~ Stahlwerke a],.so controlled several. other
-

,

-

.

-

· Dutch. st.eeL-works and rollin:g mills.·
manufacturing
.also . extended. to
- .the --------=-

The · E'~ntener connection.

., ..

industry.,,·· He was chairman'

of -·the main• Dutch railroad equipment buildei; · 11 Werkspo~r, 11 in .
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which Rheinmetall-Borsig acquired a controll1ng min~rity ~ .·
He was-prominent in ~'Maschinefabriek >Breda,11 Yihich also. came.
.

.

,

.

,

under German control •.

.

.

He was·a•director of Fokker, the famous

:aircraft manufacturer •.• which exl)erienced a· simil.ar fate.
The.most.arnbitious>deal; however,concerned Algemeene
Kunstzijde.
.
.

Onie (AKO)·•· (General Rayo~ Unibn), one .of. the four largest
· · · Dutch. companies..

Since the' 1920s Vereinigte. Glanzstoff •· had .
•

.'

.,

4"

-

.. held 30.% of its ordinary shares,and twenty' four of· th~-. forty
,-

.

.

.

-

;_

-

-

· eight outstanding preference. shares.

Thelatter·entitled i t

to oc::cupy four of eight seat.s on,the:Aufsichtsrat. · The constructi~n of .a new ·ceiluiose·· (Zellwollel plant in the Netherlands ...
.

•

•,•

•

--

.-

•

,'

.

•r

•-

- - - - - - -

.

.

'

.

,

--._

•

•_

•

>

·. pfovided the pretext-.;.-a.10 millio~ Gulden increase,. of capital'.""--···
for an increase in German ·•representation.

The .Deutsche· Bank .

handled.,the firiancing·ope:ratiqnt••in return, for which its
':Netherlands affiliate,·, :thee de·. _B~r,y.· bank·,. ,received·. a.n . add:i. ti·orial
-

.

.

.

seat .on<the Aufsichtsrat. ·. ·In. fact, matters coming.before. the
·.-Board.were decided in .advance between. Fentener,. the. head of. the
.

.

.

Dutch. 'group, and Hermann J •. Abs of the,' Deutsche Bank;· who .
'.

. ·headed the .German group • .·The arrangement, 'then, once again.
.

.

, rested ultimately on little more than the t_rust between these
. extent.' to which the German P.artners ho.nored
. ·.· . the reciprocal. ar~~ngellle,nts

in

coal and steer, manufacturing_,

and textiles after th~ war'remains·
unknown.
. :._
.
..
.

.

-,,-

There is no

. doubt, however;. :that 'relations ··•between· the Netherlands.

and.

the Reich.were strengthened during it. 49
'

.

'

. •· ·. Gerrtlan C)CCUpation· pol,icy' with· regard to Western. European.

heaYY:. industry appears, at ·first glance. "to have peen an

I
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, extraordinary success;• -. To quote the remark of >the Un:i.ted
States· Strategic Bombing ',Survey, "Without the acquisition of
steel, ore, and coke prdduction,·the Germans.would'never
have been,able to:unde:rtake, as they,did an armament program
whose "iron and steel, re1:3:uirements ,approximated the_ ~teel .
·production of.the Reich_at the·beginriingof ·t.he war~l' 5 0
·-

.

.

'

.

.

-

. .

.

.

.

'

·Steel deliveries from Western·Europe
·to;Reichpurchas~rs.r,
~

-

;averaged about'
10 . million.
tons,per:year,. and
bccurred
without' .
.
..
'

benefit bf a ·substantial increase in Ruhr coal exports:-to
·the. area ..· The achievement· re.ste.d, however, on the fundamental
willingness. of West·European industries and governmental.
authorities to produce for the Reich.
policy_wou14 be misplaced.

Credit. given Reich . ·

Neglect_and mismanagementwere

characteristic o·f .it prior to. 1943; there,after -.it was too; .
. Tat~ 'to c:orre-ct its fµndamental shortcomings.
- The -.most important of them concerned .coal.

The problem

began with the'division of administration .between Bergassessor
Bruck .in the Belgo-Dutch Kempin"".'Limburg ·seam,·. and the
.

.

.

'

. Kohlenreferent -in. the:cBrussel"s "Military· J\dministration who
· was responsible- for _the rest. · It· effectively. ruled· out the
. · poss-ibili ty of , long~term,-'. comprehensive ,pi~nning either. of
.

,-..

.

.

.,'

..

allocation or for ,production. requirement~~· Th,e• Kolllenreferent, · ·
while.technically proficient, lacked the:,power to secure _the·•·
.

'

; special .. priorities required to, provide his dis_trict with ;
adequate
- supplies
of_· raw. materials·. and ·foo¢lstuffs - and, special
.
~

.

.

.

.

.

.

treatmemt ih wage matters. - The result was'. a fall in :Belgian
coal productio"n ·from 2--:4 ,.million t·ons in January.
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I
',·

'

.

-

1941. to 1 ..0 million• ton~· by May· 1944/ approx_imately 40% of the

normal peacetime rate. · Coal· allocation was also an adrnini_stra. tive,_ disaster,_

· Initially, it' wa·s.. determined at·:informal _meetings ..

· betwee~· the Kohlenreferent, Bruck;,: and representatives of the.
ma.in cOnsumers, thefoundri~s: of eastern France and Luxemburg,
French - and Belgian civii i'ans , and the Wehrmach t.

In mi:d ".'" I 9 41 ,

.

'

Steinbririck was appointed coal Commisfiar (BEKO-WEST).; and
managed to. impose a.one~time 50% reduction in-allocations to
the Wehrrnacht.

The only effort-to deal-comprehensively, with

coal probiems in Western:Europe was a classic case.of lltoo
·• little and-too' late. nSl . In August 1941 a so-called ·.
'

'

"Westkohlena.usschussl' was formed,which brought_ together the
.

-

..

-

.

:

.

.

senior coal officials of· the' Ministry of Economics,_· the ·

Irr: the

Four Year· Plan~ and ..the<German . coal: officials

occupied

· · areas·.: :It met regularly: f~r six. months but . failed to step

' up.' allocations: to

~

·-•-

.

the' are.a of pit: props and -construction'.··

steel, and,- ' even _more imp.ortantly,: trai~ed manpower. 5 ~

By then,

'

· they were: all critically scarce. in.the Ruhr. as well •.. Be ·as. it
'

-

may, the coal : shortage provi·ded a bottleneck that prevented _·
-

-,

10 million

increases above approximately

tons of steel

production per year, caused foundriesto operc1teat -a deficit~
-_and complicated relationships between businessmen in occupied
-- .. Western -Eur~p-=. ~nd the_ Reich.·•
· _Reich ·policy might also: have exploited- the. readiness to
collaborate more· effectively., _The Party's .fear of 1:msi:riess
independence,
,whether in.the.Reicp
or elsewhere; stood
in
the
..
.
.
.
.

'·

way 'of such

·.

a -possibility.

.

.

.

Thus in

-,

.

th,«a Reichskommissariat ..

7

I
I

I

I

'I
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, Nederlande '.tije "blue ribbon" "Committee on Economic
- . · Collaboration,.11 formed .-in,_August 1940; was ordereg by
Seyss-Inquart ·to disband.,

The elimination of the customs_·

border was a ·second · slap in the face to Dutch economic
collaborators.

The Military Adrniriis.tration >in Belg'ium:-

initially appointed.as Secretary General of Economics a"proNew · Order Fleming,. ,i Vikt6rc Leemens , . whose task- it was t~

_

lldisciplin_ei• • Belgi.an industry .leaders.·· The Dresdner Bank,_
-··acting -as agent. of· the P.arty, -actually attempted forceful._ .
. if futile expropriation of Societe' General~ shareholdings~
-- The
Military
Adininistraticm· ·also· attempted. to ,frustrate·
the
.
.
.
.

.

'

.

'

.

'

.

.

efforts of the "Governor of "la G.enerale 0 to exercise an
independent· foreign policy~-· And. it was_ only after two years·:
, -

·-

·'

.

•.

"

·.

.

·. of maneuvering ,that Bichelonne secured :the. restitution of• the
:foundries

of' "Meurthe~et.;...Moselle Siid;". ·- In September 1943/ •-

. Speer insti'tuted. the ·formation of ~the
so;_called
.
.

.

Europakreis{

.

Itbrought toget~erpro-collaborationist and-German.businessmen
for. discussions. of a post-=war European economic:: .community.·_-.
·Its.existence. is. best regarded as.testimony to a missed.
. opp6rtunity_. 53 :
The occupation of Western Europe was ·nonetheless a_ tri.umph ._

I

for Ruhr i~dustry EOlicy. - The work' begun in 1926---the ·

i

. I
.·

- •. _ .creation· of strong national producer groups-:-~:..was completed:·
in '1940.

I
, I

I

!

Traditiona:l·ties were strengthened by cooperation

·on the political plane, as for instance. with _Luxemburg. : New
c~mmuni ties, of interest,· as was -- the case . with .'.Feritener in. _ ·
the. Netherla:rid·s; came into cbeing.

Anci despite .the frequent.

stupidity of German policy,. the occupation did. broaden the . •·

I
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perspectives· of at least: some .heavy industria·lists·. and
technocrats in occupied Western Europe.
The importance-of these facts was, of course, barely.felt.
· in the years following tlle •political collapse•· ~f the Reich.
.

.

.

'

.

The Ruhr Konzerne faced,. alternately, either socialization
.

:

.

'

or dissolution.· German control was only restored on 10
·- November 1948.

Continuity was· noneth~less preserved. · First·,
,.

.

.

.

'

· nowhere in·western·Europe were the strong natiC?nal producer
groups ·taken· a.part. _Only :their names were changed. >second;.
the wartime collaborators with the Ruhr·remained•in power.
,

.

,

.

-Although the Governor of .the Societe Generale; ,Alexandre
Galopin,<was felled by an assassin'sibullet, his successor,
- Max Nokin, was a man· very -much from the same mold.
•

·-

Baron
•

•

.=

·(later Count) ·de Launoit·managed to :esca,pe .. prosecution as
.

,•

a war :criminal. ·.

.

. .

.

,

'

·,

The same was true of French foundrymen,>

many of whom.could.in fact legitimately claim-to be .victims
of the_ occupation.

'In Luxemburg, Aloys Meyer, who.had fled

·- to Koblenz before the advancing. allied armies, was -restored ·
to power as, Chairman of the Board of ARBED.

Fentener van

Vlis.singen .actually headed-the special Dutch t~ibunal set·
,.

.

-

.

·.

- _up >to select ecoriomic collaborators for;· prosecution! . These
menlent their-influence to behind""."the-scenes-efforts-to
_~ppose. the lllevels:of industry'' agreements,. plans for •·
.

.

-

'

..

.

'.·

.

.

.

nationalization and dedoricehtration 'of.·Ruhr' industry, ·and,
. in general., to_ support .its ~estoraticm. 54 · The Ruhr, for
·_its _'part, offered far.-r.eaching concessions· to its 'former
cartel.partriersin:exchange for support against the Allied
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..

goverriments ~ . In December ·1947· Robert Pferdmenges-:--a banker. .,,.

. fri·end of Adenauer and th~. most influential ~usiness fig~re
of the .occupation· .period-:-:-:.-of fered ·Frertch steel producers
· :nothing less: than 50%, ow_nership of. the· iron and steel.
.

'

industry of the Ruhr • . de Wendel acted as intermediary,
'

,

anq. Aloys Meyer was also· a. party .to. the negotiations, which.·
·... continued· through 1948. ·· .Their ultimate aim, of ·course, was
~

.

·-,

.to reestablish the International Steel Cartel. 55 .
The European Coal and Steel Community is essentially:a
•

_·.

,·

,

•

•

<

gloss·on it • . Its substructure.of cartels dates from 1926
in steel and 1933 in,coal and coke.

Its operating mech-

anisms,--.-thenational groups--...:were.built. up at various times.
.
.

.

,.

'

-.

·. in .the different nations and branches over the same perio~ •
. They became• agencies.for planning and administrationin
. Germany after 1933, and. elsewh~re in Western;Europe during the ·...
: period: of occupation. · Business s:lipranationalisrn as a. bridge to. ·
political settlement· has·. been a recurring theme: · voiced by
Stresemann in 1926, reiterated in the '.'Diisseldorf Agreements ,II
and, albeit in somewhat skewed fashion, by the.Europakreis,
organized by·Speer.
..

It must be recognized that.the.Ruhr's
.

_.

'-

industrial.statesmanship and expertise are primarily respon:. sible .. for having made. a -tradition of it.
.

.,

.

The full political · ·

.

.significance of the European Cbaf- and Steel·Community.is·still
.far· from being ,properly understood.
indisputable:

One fact is;· however; ·

it ·is.· first and· foremost

an agreement

.· businessmen~ _ It .deserves more· serious .study .as .such.

between

···49
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